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Abstract:  I’ve been pondering this problem as  I participated  in this sparking conference titled 
“Beyond the Law”:  What, if anything, is “beyond the law”?   The better parent’s risk aversion; 
the propertyless man’s hunger: should we insist that these are non‐legal attributes about these 




understand how big  it  is.  But  in  the rest of my remarks  I’d  like to spool out my ambivalence 
about this.  Why does it feel more critical, more decisive, to insist on the coercive character of 
background rules, no matter how far in the background they lurk?  And why does the resulting 



















































or  despair  she will  have  to  endure;  it may  route  both  of  them back  into  a  slow,  painful  but 
genuine  reconciliation;  it  will  also  condition  small  things,  like  who  takes  out  the  garbage.    I 






















property  owner.    And  the  rules  of  property,  sitting  there  in  the  background,  didn’t  merely 
influence the wage; they coerced  it.  The propertyless man comes to the situation with one and 
only one nonlegal attribute: he is a being who must eat or die.  Every single strategy he might 
actually  adopt  to  get  food  confronts  him  with  a  world  paved  wall  to  wall  with  the  rules  of 
property.  Shall he eat that bag of peanuts sitting on the counter?   It has an owner, and though 
that owner has the legal power to give it to the propertyless man, he also has the legal right to 
refuse  to do so, and  to convey  it  to him only  for a price.    In  the actual world,  the owners of 
peanuts are all insisting on a price.   Ok, so no peanuts.  The propertyless man could grow some 




The propertyless man could make  something valuable  to sell  for money, and  try again at  the 
peanuts: but the factors of industrial production are, again, property.  Their owners can permit 
our hungry hero to use them, but all the actual owners refuse to do so in the form of rent; they 
insist on wage  labor that results  in their ownership of  the things produced.   The propertyless 
man, as we’ve said, must eat: so he sells his labor to the industrialist and takes home a wage.  
That wage, Hale  insists,  though  it  is  negotiated  between  the  employer  and  the  employee,  is 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Hale was  at  pains  to  insist  that  coercion wasn’t  necessarily  bad;  he  thought  that  the widely 
shared reluctance to use the term to describe the law’s contribution to labor contracts was the 
result of its being unnecessarily freighted with moral negativity.    Drop the normative baggage 
and  we  could  talk  about  degrees  and  kinds  of  coercion  as  endemic,  not  special.    When 
Kornhauser  and Mnookin  returned  to Hale’s  idea,  and  incorporated  it  specifically  in  a  classic 
article  on  the  law  of  divorce,  they  rejected  this:  for  them,  a  husband  and  wife  negotiating 
(rather than litigating) their divorce were engaged in private ordering.  If we extend Kornhauser 







negotiations  but  garbage  decisions;  and  to  think  of  it  as  coercive  rather  than  as  setting  the 







become even more difficult after  the partial  convergence of  left  legalism with subordination‐




can the propertyless man.   He  is acting coercively when he refuses a proposed  labor contract 
because he thinks he can get a higher wage or better working conditions elsewhere. Hale posits 
that the wage earner  is paid more than the entirely self‐interested slave owner would pay to 
maintain  a  slave,  and  that  that  increment  is  precisely  the  mark  of  the  wage  earner’s 
countercoercive power.   
 
This move opens up an  idea  that has been anathema  to  the  strong  structural‐  subordination 
theses of the identity‐political wing of the legal  left.     They see power as being over and their 












man in that social order.   Seeing  law as  intrinsic to this  immense sorting process allows us to 
see it as distributive.    
 
These  theoretical  orientations  ask  us  to  look  at  law  but  also  through  it,  to  a  world  that  is 





out,  best  interests  is  a  completely  open‐ended  standard:  if  the  husband  and  wife  were  to 

















that  condition  people’s  intimate  dealing  not  only  on  the  night  of  crisis,  but  in  everyday 
humdrum  decisions,  even  on  the  first  serious  date.    You  could  say  that  my  approach  is 
imperialistic for law; the way I teach it, law always matters.    
 
Let me  take  you  down  a  different  route  to  the  same  point.    Let’s  say  that,  because we  are 
lawyers, we regard it as an important thing to be able to say what the law is.  And here the set 
text for  legal realism, the uber‐canonical granddaddy piece of writing  is surely Oliver Wendall 
Holmes’ “Path of the Law.”3    In that essay, Holmes counseled that,  if we really want to know 
what the law is, we need to see it as the Bad Man does.  Holmes’ Bad Man is not an outlaw: he 
wants to avoid a  legal sanction, and thus to avoid breaking the  law or at  least to avoid being 
                                                
3  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes,  “The  Path  of  the  Law”  (1897)  10  Harv.  L.  Rev.  457;  For  a    useful  introduction  and 
bibliography, see  Kennedy & Fisher, Cannon, supra note 1 at 21‐43. 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sanctioned for breaking the law; but he also wants to act as self‐interestedly as he can short of 
that.  He reads the law not for its aspirational reach but for its limits; not for its moral claims, 














This  is  an  important  move  in  legal  realist  thought,  and  in  critical  legal  analysis.  It  is  almost 
exactly the opposite of Hale’s procedure, which was to pave the propertyless man’s world with 
law.    For  Holmes,  the  goal  is  “a right study and mastery of the law as a business with well 
understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed within definite lines.”4  At some point, the law runs 
out.  But it would not be right to say that the Bad Man is free to act in the domain where law 
runs out.  The Bad Man is by definition acting within law.  As long as he modifies his conduct in 
deference  to  a  fear  of  legal  sanction,  he  occupies  a  space  of  permission,  not  freedom.    The 
scope of that domain, its contents, everything about its landscape, are created by the law.  It’s a 
little like the image of the vase that is also the image of a face, but never both at the same time 







What will  in this paper hereafter be meant by "law"  is ….  in first  instance 
and  especially  all  that  the  lawmen  do,  as  such.  And  in  second  instance, 
what  one  may  reasonably  anticipate  that  they  will  do.  And  in  third 
instance, the rules  laid down for their doing. Fourthly, the  ideology about 
their  doing  prevalent  among  them  (following  precedent,  e.g.).  Lastly,  the 












all  the  lawmen do, all  the  things one can  reasonably predict  that  they will do,  the  rules  they 
apply,  the  ideologies  they  hold,  and  the  ideologies  that  “other  folk”  have  about  them  –  no 
matter  how  contradictory,  these  are  all  “law”;  and  ultimately  they  matter  because  of  “any 
effects” that they have on “other people.”  “Other people” exist beyond the law; but once any 




this  tradition  is  finding  some  way  of  containing  and  ordering  the  almost  crazy‐making 
complexity of law seen this way. Here is an example, from my own work in progress on same‐
sex marriage as we have it  in the US.     When same‐sex marriage advocates began to see that 
they would win  recognition  for  same‐sex marriage  in  some  state  courts,  they  also  began  to 
argue that marriages valid in a first‐mover state would be valid in all the other states, through 
the operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.6  Never mind that 
there  is  no  basis  in  positive  Full  Faith  law  for  this  claim;  it’s  not  absolutely  contradicted  by 
positive law, and it took the law reviews quite a while to print all the spin that advocates were 
willing  to  put  on  that  gap  in  the  rules.    By  that  time,  opponents  to  same‐sex marriage  had 
gotten really alarmed and angry: would red states have to recognize first‐mover‐state same‐sex 
marriages,  despite  adamant  popular,  legislative  and  judicial  opposition within  their  borders?  
They discovered a rule that sits quietly in judicial doctrine, saying that a marriage valid where it 




purpose was  to  tell  state  courts not only  that  there will  be no  same‐sex marriage within  the 





falling  apart,  but  this  time  let’s  give  her  a  woman  for  a  spouse.  Let’s  say  they  married  in 
Massachusetts, and live there.  Far away is the state of Virginia, a state with a ferociously strong 
DOMA.  The Virginia DOMA not only bars recognition of same‐sex marriages; it bars recognition 
of  same‐sex  civil  unions,  same‐sex  partnership  contracts  and  even  any  “other  arrangement 
                                                
6 For the story in detail, with citations, see Janet Halley, “Behind the Law of Marriage, Part II: Travelling Marriage,” 
– Unbound: A Harvard Journal of the Legal Left – (Forthcoming 2011). 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almost all applications of  federal  law  is an  intrinsic characteristic of her marriage.   You might 
think this makes her more vulnerable, but let’s make her a Bad Woman. Let’s suppose it dawns 
on her that – if she and her spouse moved to Virginia, she could just walk out on her partner, 
taking  far more  of  their  shared  assets  than what Massachusetts  divorce  law would  give  her.  
She  could  even  take  far  more  than  Virginia  contract  law  would  give  her,  because  Virginia’s 






If  we  follow  Holmes  and  Llewellyn  again,  the  complex  richochet  pattern  of  powers  and 
vulnerabilities  that  this choice of  law regime creates between the parties  to a Massachusetts 









if we undo  the enclosures and  restore  the commons.     The only  reason his propertyless man 




him  into contact with other  background  rules,  so perhaps Hale’s world‐paved‐with‐law vision 
can be restored simply by pitching  it 1, 2, 3 ……. “n”  levels of generality  lower.   But  if we are 
going  to go all  the way, don’t we have  to admit at  some point  that  some of  the background 
systems that matter aren’t  legal?   After all,  the fact that he must eat  is not a product of  law.  
What  if his psyche, his aesthetic sense, his age and stamina play a role?       Maybe my solitary 
woman decides to stay in her marriage not because she anticipates that divorce would be too 
                                                
7 Va. Code Ann. § 20‐45.3 (2004).  The argument above depends on the continuing constitutionality of the DOMAs.  
If they are decisively held to be unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court – and  litigation currently underway may 











I’ve been pondering this problem as  I participated  in  this sparkling conference titled “Beyond 
the  Law”:    What,  if  anything,  is  “beyond  the  law”?      The  better  parent’s  risk  aversion;  the 
propertyless  man’s  hunger:  should  we  insist  that  these  are  nonlegal  attributes  about  these 









drawing  it?   What’s  at  stake  in  positing  that  law  is  everywhere  –  or  that  there  is  something 
beyond it?     
 
Let’s  take  a  break  from  law  completely  to  see  what  can  be  said  on  the  other  side  of  this 
ambivalence.  Let’s go “beyond law.”  I’ve gotten myself in hot water with some feminists of my 
generation  by  arguing  that  it  might  be  useful,  might  be  revealing,  might  open  us  up  to 














                                                
8 Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006). 
9  Janet Halley & Andrew Parker, eds., After  Sex? On Writing Since Queer Theory  (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 2011). 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needs explaining or fixing.  These are structuralist hypotheses; those who espouse them posit a 
deep  structure  to  human  life,  and  dedicate  themselves  to  discovering  it  and  its  pervasive 
influence  in  parts  of  life  that  seem  utterly  innocent  of  it.    They  demand  of  themselves  a 




One of  the odd things about this widely shared reaction,  though,  is  that third wave feminism 
became possible only through a break with intellectual and political  ideas of sex and sexuality 
prevailing  in  the  1960’s;  and queer  theory  became possible  only when  some political,  social, 
intellectual  and  libidinal  energies  that  were  effervescing  in  the  late  1980’s  and  early  1990’s 
focused themselves on a desire to understand sexuality in terms other than feminist.  Feminism 
was born saying “No” to the ideas about gender in which it emerged.  Queer theory was more 
ambivalent;  the  idea  behind  about  half  of  queer  theory  at  the  time  it  emerged  wasn’t  to 
contradict feminism, but to add to it.  To work on another dimension.  To use other key terms.  





it,  in my  view, was  the way  it  shook up our  ideas  about power.    Coming  into  it, many of  its 
inventors were all  feminists all  the  time, and our  feminism was about bad,  top‐down power.  
We were committed to an anti‐subordination project.  Some of us imagined women’s power as 
redemptive;  some  thought  that  power  itself  was  irredeemable.    We  ran  smack  dab  into 





force  was  supposedly  in  its  most  magnificent  heyday,  sexuality  was  being  produced  – 
proliferated – in the profusion of repressive apparatuses that spanned Victorian society.   They 
weren’t  effectively  repressive  –  if  anything,  they were  immensely  productive.      The  problem 
was sexuality itself, not its repression. He imagined that we could loosen the “grip” of sexuality 
on our bodies and our pleasures if we imagined power otherwise.  Power, he posited, might not 
be  the  Law; we  needed  to  get  beyond  the  idea  that  it  primarily  resides  in  the  King  and  his 
Sword; it might be an immanent web of highly mobile impulses running throughout human life, 
congealing sometimes in concentrated forceful energies that could amount to domination, but 
more  usually  dispersed,  small,  and  fluid.    Power  might  include  rather  than  oppose  itself  to 
resistance.   









wrote  Volume  1,  he  didn’t  really.      The  idea  that  sexuality  had  a  grip  on  our  bodies  and 
pleasures and that we must engage in a deep strategy to get free of it – that very idea is built on 
the  form of power‐over; of domination; of  the Law as  the Law of  the Father,  the Law as  the 
sword  of  the  prince.    The  Foucault  of  Volume  One  had  not  achieved  the  transformation  of 
power that Hale had successfully wrought many years before, working on coercion.11 
 
American Queer  Theory  inherited  this  partially  achieved break with  the  Law,  and one of  the 
reasons it has never fit too well into critical studies in the law school is that this image of law is 
so  unlike  the  one we  inherit  from  legal  realism.    The  paranoid  attitude  that  the  Foucault  of 




about  law  and  about  power  in  Volume  2  of  his  History  of  Sexuality.    This  book  was  first 
published  in  French  in  1984  –  almost  a  decade  after  Volume  1.12        Studying  late  antique 
conduct books, Foucault discovered the unimportance of what he called the “moral code” – the 
rules about what sexual things one should and should not do.  Instead, the emphasis of these 
books  fell  on  inculcating  an  attitude of  self‐observation,  self‐management;  the  experience of 
sexuality as problematic resulted in an idea of the self as self‐governing.  Becoming the subject 
of sexual desires was becoming an ethical subject, a subject  in relationship to  itself; a subject 
whose  characteristic  form  of  power  is  self‐observation  and  self‐management.    “I  am  not 
supposing that the codes are unimportant,” Foucault wrote.  But they were not legal mandates; 



















And  as  to  those  for  whom  to  work  hard,  to  begin  and  begin  again,  to 
attempt and be mistaken,  to  go back and  rework everything  from  top  to 
bottom, and still find reason to hesitate from one step to the next – as to 
those,  in  short,  for  whom  to  work  in  the  midst  of  uncertainty  and 
apprehension  is  tantamount  to  failure,  all  I  can  say  is  that  clearly we are 
not from the same planet.14   
Do  we  have  the  courage  to  loosen  our  hold  on  what  we  think  we  know  because  we  are 
students of law, and go on a similar voyage?  
 
I  propose  that what  Foucault went  through  intellectually  between 1974  and 1984 was  a  trip 
“beyond  the  law.”   He was willing,  almost  literally,  to  take a break  from  the  idea of,  and his 
chronic resentment of, Law as the Sword.   The result was disorientation, years of  research  in 















pounding of  the human heart.   And politics: we hardly ever  teach or  study politics: we study 
politics as it is govered by law.  To a hammer everything is a nail – and to legally trained people, 





                                                
14 Ibid.,at 7. 
